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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

PATRICK L. STANLEY

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 980126-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals his convictions of one count of distributing or arranging to
distribute methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior conviction, a first degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998), and one count of
possession or use of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior conviction, a firstdegree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1998).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing defendant's proposed
instruction on entrapment and giving the jury an instruction
that tracked the statutory language, where Utah's appellate
courts have approved entrapment instructions that follow the
statute's words?

"An appeal challenging a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction or
claiming that a jury instruction incorrectly states the law presents a question of law which
we review for correctness." State v. Tinoco. 860 P.2d 988, 989-90 (Utah App. 1993)
(citing State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993)). "It is within the trial court's
discretion . . . to select between two accurate but different jury instructions." State v.
Gallegos. 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d 1328,
1332 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1990)). "Even if we find an error,
however, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error
affected the outcome of his case." Tmoco, 860 P.2d at 990 (citing State v. Garrett, 849
P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

Did the trial court plainly err in instructing the jury that
whether defendant had a prior drug conviction was an element
of the offense of possession or use of a controlled substance
where no settled Utah appellate law has directly addressed the
issue?

To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) an error
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain
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error. Id. at 1209.
3.

Was Officer Terry's unequivocal, uncontroverted testimony,
based on personal knowledge, that the motel in which defendant
committed the offenses was within a drug-free zone sufficient to
prove that element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt?

In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, an
appellate court reviews the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. The court reverses a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983): see also State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540,
543 (Utah 1994); State v. Harlev. 982 P.2d 1145,1147 (Utah App. 1999).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following are set forth in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1), (2) (1998).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Defendant was charged by amended information with one count of distributing or
arranging to distribute methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior conviction, a

^ h e facts, unless otherwise stated, are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict.
3

first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998), and one
count of possession or use of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone with a prior
conviction, afirst-degreefelony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (1998) (R. 24).
Before trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the grounds of entrapment
(R. 29). The trial court held a hearing on the issue, and denied the motion (R. 209 at 9194).
A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 213 at 46-47). The trial court sentenced
him to two concurrent terms of five years to life in prison, and a fine of $1,000 with a
surcharge of $850 (R. 214 at 9-10).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 174).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Edie Randall knew defendant as a drug connection (R. 212 at 23, 52). In fact, she
owed him $350 for a drug deal (R. 212 at 24, 42). On March 27, 1997, Edie landed in
Emery County Jail on drug charges. Eager to free herself, she told Officer J.D. Mangum
of the Carbon-Emery County Drug Task Force that she would set up a controlled buy
from defendant in exchange for release from jail (R. 211 at 141).
Edie had acted as a confidential informant in approximately 170 controlled buys
during the previous six to seven months (R. 211 at 178, 212 at 29). Mangum told Edie
that the drug task force would not pay her or help her out on her drug charges, but that
they would facilitate her pretrial release on her own recognizance in exchange for her
4

participation in the buy (R. 211 at 142, 179).
Mangum was with Edie at the jail when she telephoned defendant and left
messages on his pager (R. 211 at 142,212 at 34). When defendant called her back, she
asked him if he had any methamphetamine, whether he could meet with her, and how
much money she should bring (R. 212 at 24). At Mangum's request, Edie asked to buy
two ounces of methamphetamine (R. 211 at 144).2 Defendant told Edie the drugs would
cost $1,200 (R. 211 at 143, 212 at 24). He brought up the subject of the money she owed
him, and asked her if she had the money. She told him she did (R. 212 at 35-36). They
arranged to meet in the parking lot of the Spanish Fork K-Mart at 9 p.m.(R. 211 at 149,
212 at 25). Edie told defendant that she would be accompanied by a drug dealer from
Price who would drive drive her to the K-Mart and make the buy (R. 211 at 147, R. 212 at
25).
Officer Mangum picked up $1,200 from the task force in Springville (R. 211 at
145). He and Edie drove to the K-Mart. Defendant showed up a few minutes later.
Defendant asked to speak to Edie privately. They stood over by defendant's car and
talked for a few minutes out of Mangum's hearing (R. 211 at 150, 212 at 37). Edie then
returned to Mangum's car and said that defendant wanted to go get some dinner from

2

Two ounces of methamphetamine is a large quantity. The officer decided to ask
for two ounces because "[defendant] didn't want to come clear to Spanish Fork for small
dollar value . . . " (R. 211 at 146). Also, since Mangum was posing as a drug dealer, he
needed to request a quantity large enough to re-sell (id,).
5

Taco Time (R. 211 at 151).
Defendant returned a few minutes later and he, Edie, and Mangum stood outside in
the parking lot (id.). Defendant discussed the terms of the deal with Mangum (R. 211 at
152). He told Mangum he didn't have the methamphetamine with him and he would have
to return to Salt Lake to get it (R. 211 at 155). The officer was not surprised that
defendant did not bring the drugs with him: "Lots of times on that kind of quantity, and
me being a new person, sometimes they don't bring it. They want to see what kind of
deal they are getting into before they get ripped off themselves" (R. 211 at 155).
Defendant told Mangum that two ounces of methamphetamine would cost $1,200
(R. 211 at 152). Mangum showed defendant the money "to let him know I'm legitimate"
(R. 211 at 154). Defendant wanted Mangum to "front" the entire amount (R. 211 at 152).
Mangum replied that since he didn't know defendant, there was no way he was going to
let that kind of money go (id.).
Defendant then asked Mangum if Mangum was going to "stand good for [Edie's]
debt" (R. 211 at 153). Mangum was "really surprised, because I hadn't heard anything
about the debt. I didn't know there was any debt to be had" (id.). Mangum refused to
take care of Edie's debt, but allowed that "[w]e might work something out for part of it"
(R.211atl54).
Defendant told Mangum that he didn't want to drive all the way back to Spanish
Fork from Salt Lake, and that he would meet them halfway in Lehi (R. 211 at 153-54,
6

156). He told them to get a motel room, and then page him to relay the room and phone
numbers (R. 211 at 154). Mangum gave defendant $100 to seal the deal (R. 211 at 154).
Mangum and Edie went to the Timpanogos Inn in Lehi and obtained two adjoining
rooms (R. 211 at 159-60). Mangum and Edie waited in one room, and officers
monitoring the transaction set up surveillance in the other (id.). Other officers watched
the roads leading to the motel (R. 211 at 160-61).
Edie called defendant's pager (R. 211 at 159). About 20 to 25 minutes later, he
called back (R. 211 at 160). A few minutes later, he knocked on the door (R. 211 at 161).
Defendant spoke with Edie alone in the bathroom for a few minutes (R. 211 at 161-62).
Mangum could not hear the details of that conversation (id.). When defendant and Edie
emerged, defendant told Mangum that he could only get half the agreed-upon amount,
because his friends had already sold the rest (R. 211 at 162). He said that he would get
the rest and sell it to Mangum at a later date (id.). He said Mangum could give him $550
and keep the $50 Mangum had paid for the motel room (id.).
Defendant gave Mangum the methamphetamine and took the money (R. 211 at
167-163). Then, as Mangum was getting ready to give the other officers the "bust
signal," defendant took out a black plastic case containing a small bag of
methamphetamine (R. 211 at 163). Defendant crushed some of the drug and scraped it
into the case (R. 211 at 163). He handed the small bag to Edie (id.). Then, as Mangum
recalled, "all of a sudden he took a line out and snorted" the powdered methamphetamine
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in the plastic case QdL). At that point, the other officers burst into the room and arrested
defendant (R. 211 at 165). They found Zigzag papers in his pocket, as well as
"numerous small baggies" (R. 211 at 305-06).
Officers searched the red Subaru wagon defendant was driving and found a
container of denatured alcohol, a butane torch, razor blades, and marijuana seeds (R. 211
at 259). According to state crime lab chemist Dr. David Murdock, denatured alcohol and
butane torches are often used in methamphetamine manufacturing (R. 211 at 244).3
Butane torches are also used to vaporize methamphetamine so that users can inhale the
drug (R. 211 at 260).
Defendant did not own the red Subaru, but Edie had seen him driving it one or two
times previously (R. 212 at 162). And, one week before defendant's arrest, Officer
Harold Terry observed Edie and defendant conversing window-to-window in two parked

3

Methamphetamine production involves the use of iodine, red phosphorus and
other chemicals not soluble in alcohol (R. 211 at 244-45). Denatured alcohol is used to
separate methamphetamine from the other chemicals used in methamphetamine
manufacture. The alcohol is mixed with methamphetamine precursors (id.). Although
methamphetamine dissolves in the alcohol, the other chemicals do not (id.). When the
mixture is poured through a filter, methamphetamine and alcohol pass through, and the
insoluble chemicals remain in the filter (id.). The alcohol-methamphetamine mixture is
then heated with a propane or butane torch (id.). The alcohol evaporates readily, leaving
methamphetamine crystals (id.).
8

cars in Lehi (R. 212 at 165). Defendant was sitting in the drivers' seat of the red Subaru
GcL).4
'What Are You Talking About? "
At trial, defendant claimed that he had known Edie for two or three months before
his arrest (R. 212 at 72). He said he had visited Edie's home in Price on a couple of
occasions and had performed home and auto repairs for her (id.). He said he had loaned
$350 to Edie so she could make a payment on her trailer (R. 212 at 75).5
Defendant claimed that when he first spoke to Edie by telephone on March 27, she
announced that she could pay him the money she "borrowed" (R. 212 at 80). He further
asserted that she said, "I need you to bring me an ounce" (id.). He claimed he was
"shocked" by the request, replying, "What are you talking about?" (id.). He nevertheless
agreed to meet her (R. 212 at 81).
Defendant maintained that when he spoke to Edie privately in the K-Mart parking
lot, she seemed "nervous or scared," "distraught," and "almost started crying . . . like she
was desperate" (R. 212 at 86, 90-91).

Defendant said Edie told him "I owe this guy

4

Defendant testified that before his arrest, he had "never been to Lehi in [his] life"
(R. 212 at 96, 141).
defendant's testimony on this point was corroborated by Suzanne Webb, who
claimed that she was present when defendant loaned Edie the $350 (R. 212 at 63).
Although Webb testified that "(j]ust basically it [the details of the loan transaction] was
kind of between the three of us [Edie, defendant, and Webb]," the prosecutor and defense
counsel stipulated that Ryan Webb and Tiffany Warner would testify that they too had
witnessed the loan transaction (R. 212 at 63, 67-68).
9

[referring to Mangum] and I need to get him an ounce and I don't know what he'll do if I
can't pay him" (R. 212 at 86). Defendant said he was worried for Edie because he had
"heard lots of stories about drug dealers . . . I mean, the TV.. ."(R. 212 at 87-88). He
explained that his worries stemmed from an incident 20 years previously when a woman
in his neighborhood owed money to drug dealers and "[t]hey cut off her toe with a pair of
bolt cutters" (R. 212 at 87-90). Defendant said he offered to drive Edie away, but she
declined, saying "I can't. He knows where I live" (R. 212 at 90-91). Defendant said
Edie told him she thought Mangum had a gun (R. 212 at 90).
Defendant claimed he initially refused to help Edie, telling her he did not have any
methamphetamine (R. 212 at 86, 91). He said that despite his repeated statements to
Mangum that he did not have any methamphetamine, Mangum made numerous requests
for the drug (R. 212 at 93-95). Defendant said he ultimately verbally agreed to "see if he
could help" Mangum and Edie (R. 212 at 95). Nevertheless, he claimed that he remained
undecided whether to follow through until Mangum ran up to his car as he prepared to
drive away, handed him $100, and said "Here, this is for her debt, and that seals the deal"
(R. 212 at 97). Defendant said that "[a]t that p o i n t . . . I kind of thought, 'He's obligating
me. He's got her and he's obligating me' (id.).
Defendant stated he returned to Salt Lake and "started calling around seeing if
there was any way or anybody that knew how to procure [methamphetamine]" (R. 212 at
98). He obtained the drugs, then met Mangum and Edie at the motel. He stated that after
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the drugs and money were exchanged, he took out "a little straw" that had been in the
plastic box and "and I went (demonstrating)" (R. 212 at 104).6
Defendant testified that the propane torch found in the Subaru was probably used
by the vehicle's owner "to refmish, or like, antique and burn furniture" (R. 212 at 107).
He opined that the denatured alcohol was used to thin shellac (R. 212 at 108). He said he
used Zigzag papers "to repair my [broken] cigarettes" (R. 212 at 109).
Defendant acknowledged that he was convicted of drug possession four years
earlier after police found in his car "a little bindle with methamphetamine, approximately
5- to $10 worth, I would say" (R. 212 at 110). He also had a conviction for making a
false report to a police officer (R. 212 at 110-11).
On cross examination, defendant stated that he made calls from "five or six" pay
phones to obtain the drugs (R. 212 at 123). In his search for drugs, defendant claimed to
have called a "Jayson," two "Bills," and a "Mark":
Defendant: I called somebody named Jayson.
Prosecutor: How did you know him?
Defendant: From my tree service. I had just met him. I was on a job and
he lived down the street or something.
Prosecutor: Okay. What's his last name?
Defendant: I don't know.
Prosecutor: And yet you felt like he might be someone that could get you
6

Defendant apparently demonstrated that he blew the methamphetamine powder
out of the box, as opposed to snorting it. After defendant testified, the prosecutor recalled
Officer Mangum and asked him whether defendant could have been blowing the powder
out of the box (R. 212 at 173). Mangum replied that he saw defendant inhale the
substance up his nose (id.).
11

Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:

Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:
Prosecutor:
Defendant:

some methamphetamine, is that right?
I was taking a shot in the dark.
Who else did you call?
I called a guy named Bill in West Valley.
What is Bill's last name?
I don't know.
Okay. Who else?
There was a couple people that weren't home.
Okay. Who were they?
There's another guy named Bill.
What was his last name?
I don't know. These are just people. These are not personal
friends. So . . .
Okay. Who else?
I don't - and Mark.
What's his last name?
I don't know.
You don't know his either? Mr. Stanley, how did you look
these people's number up in the phone book if you don't
know their last name?
Well, I looked the first one up Now, you said you called a couple of these people from the
phone book?
Uh-huh (affirmative). Uh-huh (affirmative).
How did you look them up if you didn't know their last name,
sir?
Well, Mark, I looked up under Andy's Garage, because that's
where he worked.
So you knew him well enough to know where he worked?
Right.
But you don't know his last name?
No.
He worked at Andy's Garage?
Uh-huh (affirmative).
And Andy's Garage was open at 10 o'clock at night?
No. That was one of the people that I couldn't get ahold of.

(R. 212 at 123-25, Addendum B).
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Defendant testified he finally obtained the methamphetamine from a "Joe
Martinez" (R. 212 at 121). He did not know where "Joe" lived (]dL). And, although he
had not seen "Joe" for four or five years, "Joe" did not require defendant to pay for the
methamphetamine (R. 212 at 121,142).
Officer Mangum's and Edie 's Testimony
Mangum testified that he had received training in entrapment, and that he did not
see anything in his and Edie's transactions with defendant that he felt was improper (R.
211 at 196). Mangum said that in his conversation with defendant in the K-Mart parking
lot, he did not ask defendant to get methamphetamine; instead, defendant volunteered to
go up to Salt Lake and get the drug (R. 211 at 186). Furthermore, Mangum said he did
not observe Edie make repeated requests for the drug (R. 211 at 196). Mangum said
defendant did not exhibit any reluctance to do the deal (R. 211 qt 157, 196).
Edie testified that she never told defendant that she was afraid of Mangum (R. 212
at 27). She said defendant never said he didn't want to sell the drugs, and he showed no
reluctance to engage in the transaction (id.). She did not recall having to ask him for the
drugs more than once (R. 212 at 28). She denied telling defendant she was worried for
her safety, and said she did not display any concern to defendant (R. 212 at 38). She said
she did not tell defendant Mangum was armed, or that Mangum knew where she lived (R.
212 at 38-39). She denied that defendant told her that he could drive her away from the
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parking lot (id.). She said defendant never loaned her money for a trailer payment, and
that, in fact, her trailer had been paid off since June 1996 (R. 212 at 42, 162).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it refused to give
defendant's proposed jury instruction on entrapment. Defendant's proposed instruction
included examples of entrapment set forth in State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 503 (Utah
1979). However, the instruction given in this case quoted the statutory language almost
verbatim. The statute itself incorporates the appropriate objective test to be employed by
the trier of fact in determining whether entrapment occurred. Since the jury instruction
accurately stated the law, the trial court did not err in giving it to the jury.
Point II. Defendant further maintains that the trial court committed plain error in
instructing the jury that a prior drug conviction was an element of possession or use of a
controlled substance. He also claims that he was denied his right to effective assistance
of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the instruction. However, the case cited
by defendant in support of his contention is distinguishable on its facts. Since there is no
settled Utah appellate law on the exact issue defendant raises, any "error" could not have
been plain to the trial court. In any event, the alleged error was harmless because
defendant's prior convictions were already properly in evidence. Defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim likewise fails because no error occurred and no prejudice
resulted.
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Point III. Finally, defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed within a drug-free zone.
However, the prosecutor presented competent, believable testimony from Officer Terry,
who testified from personal knowledge that the motel in which defendant sold the drugs
was within 1,000 feet from a school, a McDonald's playland, and a ball field. Viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, that testimony was sufficient to establish
that the crimes occurred within a drug-free zone.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION
ON ENTRAPMENT BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTION
GIVEN ACCURATELY STATED THE LAW
Defendant complains that the trial court erred in not giving his proposed
instruction on entrapment. He claims that the instruction given failed to inform the jury
that the test for entrapment employs an objective standard which focuses on the conduct
of the government agents as opposed to the predisposition of the defendant to commit the
offense (R. 143, Addendum C). Appellant's Brief at 24.
Defendant is correct that entrapment is assessed under an objective standard.
Contrary to defendant's claims, however, that objective standard is embodied in the
language of the entrapment statute. Since the instruction given to the jury repeated the
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statute's language nearly verbatim, the jury was properly instructed on the law of
entrapment.
Jury Instruction no. 11 stated:
It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the
offense.
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting
in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready
to commit it.
(R. 143, Addendum C). The instruction recited Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) almost
word for word, differing only in its substitution of the words "defendant" for "actor" in
the first sentence, "law enforcement officer" for "peace officer" in the second sentence,
and in the omission of the sentence "[c]onduct merely affording a person an opportunity
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment." Those minor changes did not
materially alter or detract from the statute's meaning.
In Taylor, 599 P.2d at 499, the Utah Supreme Court observed that the entrapment
statute "by its express terms incorporates the objective standard." The court rejected the
subjective test for entrapment previously employed. The subjective test required two
inquiries: "(1) whether there was an inducement on the part of the government, and (2) if
so, whether the defendant showed any predisposition to commit the offense." Id at 499500. The objective test adopted in Taylor "shifts attention from the record and
predisposition of the particular defendant to the conduct of the police and the likelihood,
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objectively considered, that it would entrap only those ready and willing to commit
crime.' Therefore, only police conduct that 'entraps' those ready and willing to commit
the crime is acceptable." State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 750 (Utah 1984).
Because the words of the statute reflect the objective standard, the statute itself is
an appropriate jury instruction. The Utah Supreme Court "has approved giving the
statutory definition of entrapment to the jury," as has this Court. Cripps, 692 P.2d at 748
(citing State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Squire, 888 P.2d
1102, 1104 (Utah App. 1994). In Squire, this Court held that a trial court did not err in
refusing to give a defendant's proposed jury instruction on entrapment where the
instruction given followed the statutory language. "The language of the instruction given
by the trial court to the jury directly tracks the statute establishing the entrapment defense.
. . . Defendant cannot claim that he was prejudiced by a jury instruction that tracks the
very statutory language under which he asserted his defense." Id; see also State v.
Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah App. 1990) (no error in refusing defendant's requested
instruction where instructions given to the jury "directly parallel the statutory language
and correctly instruct on the applicable law"). The instruction given here tracked the
statute, focusing on the activities of law enforcement agents and those acting in at the
direction of, or in cooperation with, law enforcement agents. Thus, the instruction
adequately instructed the jury on the appropriate objective standard.
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Although defendant argues that his proposed instruction more fully explained the
law of entrapment, this Court has held that "[i]t is within the trial court's discretion . . . to
select between two accurate but different jury instructions

Our inquiry therefore must

center on the jury instruction actually used and determine whether it accurately states the
law. So long as the jury instruction used was accurate, it was not error for the trial court
to refuse a different instruction that was also accurate." State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586,
590 (Utah App. 1993). Although a defendant is "entitled to an instruction on his or her
theory of the case, he is not entitled to multiple instructions setting forth the same
theory." State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989). Since the instruction given was
accurate, there was no error in giving it, and this Court need not consider the propriety of
defendant's proposed instruction. Gallegos, 849 P.2d at 590.
Defendant's proposed jury instruction quoted from Taylor examples of
government conduct that, depending on the circumstances, might constitute entrapment
(R. 246, Addendum C).7 Defendant claims that these examples are "indispensable to any

defendant's proposed instruction included the following:
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy,
pity, or close personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money,
are examples, depending on an evaluation of the circumstances in each
case, of what might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating the
course of conduct between the government representative and the
defendant, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction
between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the inducements
of the agent, are all to be considered in judging what the effect of the
governmental agent's conduct would be on a normal [in Taylor, "average"]
person.
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meaningful review and analysis of the issue of entrapment...." Appellant's Brief at 27.
He asserts that the failure to provide the jury with the examples left the jury unable to
fully understand the defense of entrapment. Id.
However, the list of examples in Taylor is not exhaustive, nor is each example
universally present. Instead, as Taylor and its progeny recognize, a variety of factors and
circumstances may or may not constitute entrapment. See, e.g.. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d
497 (Utah 1989) (alleged friendship did not constitute entrapment); State v. Udell, 728
P.2d 131 (Utah 1986) (no entrapment where defendant's conduct showed he stood ready
to commit offense); State v. Sprague. 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984 (persistent requests for
drugs constituted entrapment); ) State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980)(same);
State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1995) (friendship alone did not create
entrapment). Since the existence of entrapment depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case, the trial court was not required to provide hypothetical
examples of entrapment. Indeed, a requirement that the trial court instruct the jury on
hypothetical entrapment scenarios that may not be relevant to the case at hand could
create confusion in jurors' minds.
Here, once the trial court properly instructed the jury on the legal standard, defense

Taylor, 599 P.2d at 503. Since Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Taylor's
reference to an "average person" was dicta and, due to its potential for obscuring the
proper legal standard, "should not be elevated to law by being recited in a jury
instruction." Cripps, 692 P.2d at 750. Defendant's proposed instruction referring to "a
normal person" was arguably problematic under Cripps.
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counsel was free to argue from the evidence the specific facts supporting the defense of
entrapment. During closing argument, defense counsel discussed the objective standard
at some length:
[The entrapment statute] says, "does [the government agent] induce the
commission of an offense? The language of that statute directly focuses on
the verb there, "did that person induce the commission of an offense."
What did that person do in order to induce the commission of an offense?
Entrapment says, "did they induce the commission of an offense?"
And I think the evidence shows that that's what has occurred here, is Edie
Randle used what she knew about Patrick Stanley in order to get him to get
her some methamphetamine. And he went to Salt Lake and he did.... I
want you to think about everything you have heard in the last two days in
light of that statute. Did she induce the commission of this offense? And if
she induced it, then he didn't do it knowingly and intentionally.... In
looking at [the jury instruction] as a whole, talking about the inducement
and whether or not that happened, and what that means, it's important to
couple that with the remaining part of that, that it has to be done by methods
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it.
(R. 213 at 20-21, 24-25). In addition to explaining the objective standard, defense
counsel thoroughly described the evidence supporting defendant's entrapment defense (R.
213 at 19-38, Addendum E). In light of defense counsel's argument setting forth the
specific facts of this case supporting entrapment, defendant's proposed jury instruction
listing hypothetical examples of entrapment would have been superfluous. The jury was
fully informed of both the applicable law and defendant's factual theory of the case.
No Reasonable Likelihood of a Different Outcome. Defendant maintains that if
the trial court had instructed the jury as he proposed, there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury would not have convicted him.. Appellant's Brief at 30. That contention
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assumes that the jury believed defendant's version of the events.8 It is well established
that it is the prerogative of the trier of fact to judge the credibility of witnesses and to
believe the testimony of one witness over another. State v. Udell 728 P.2d 131, 132
(Utah 1986) (jury was free to disbelieve defendant's controverted testimony that
confidential informant entrapped him into supplying marijuana). "[Determinations of
witness credibility are left to the jury. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part
of any witness's testimony." State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) (citing
State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 904-05 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah
1990)).
Although defendant denied that he had sold drugs to Edie in the past and claimed
that he and Edie enjoyed a friendship independent of any drug dealings, Edie contradicted
his testimony, consistently maintaining that she knew defendant primarily as a drug
contact (R. 212 at 23, 42). Edie disputed defendant's statements at trial that she exhibited
fear for her safety (R. 212 at 27). Furthermore, Mangum stated that he did not observe

8

In fact, it is unlikely that the jury found defendant credible. On cross
examination, defendant could not remember the last names of persons he had telephoned
(from "five or six" pay phones) in his search for drugs (R. 212 at 123, Addendum B). He
was vague about what telephone numbers he called and how he came to obtain those
phone numbers (id.). He further claimed that "Joe Martinez," the distant acquaintance
from whom he eventually obtained the drugs allowed him to walk away with $600 worth
of methamphetamine without paying anything for it, even though "Joe" had not seen
defendant in four or five years (R. 212 at 121). Finally, defendant made the dubious
claim that he blew the methamphetamine powder out of the plastic case, rather than
inhaling it as Officer Mangum observed (R. 212 at 104).
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anything improper in Edie's conduct (R. 212 at 196). The jury obviously chose to believe
the testimony of Mangum and Edie over defendant's claims.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR DRUG POSSESSION
WAS AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF POSSESSION OR USE
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BECAUSE THE PRIOR
CONVICTION WAS ALREADY PROPERLY BEFORE THE JURY
Jury Instruction no. 5 provided that an element of possession or use of a controlled
substance as it was charged in the amended information was that defendant "had
previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance" (R. 149, Addendum
F). Defendant claims that this Court's decision in State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724 (Utah
App. 1996) established that a prior conviction does not change the nature of the offense,
but merely enhances the penalty to be imposed. Appellant's Brief at 32. Therefore,
defendant asserts, it was plain error for the trial court to instruct the jury that a prior
conviction was an element of the charged offense. Appellant's Brief at 31-34.
Alternatively, defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
the instruction. Appellant's Brief at 34-37.
Defendant acknowledges that his claim was not preserved below, but maintains
that this Court may nevertheless address it as plain error under rule 19(c), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure ("to avoid manifest injustice"). Appellant's Brief at 31. Plain error
requires that (1) an error exist, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court,
and (3) but for the error, there would be "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
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outcome" for defendant, or, stated another way, the error undermines confidence in the
outcome of the proceedings. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v.
Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah App. 1995). If any one of these elements is missing,
there is no plain error. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Here, defendant has not shown error.
Furthermore, he cannot show prejudice because his prior convictions were already
properly before jury.
A.

No Error, Obvious or Otherwise, Occurred.
Although defendant relies on Portillo, that case is distinguishable. In Portillo, the

defendant was charged with three counts of distributing or arranging to distribute
marijuana under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-l(a), a third-degree felony. Portillo, 914 P.2d
at 726. Utah Code Ann. § 58-8-l(b)(ii) provided, as it does now, that "upon a second or
subsequent conviction" for distributing or arranging to distribute, a defendant could be
punished for a second-degree felony. Count I was charged as a third-degree felony, and
because they were viewed as second or subsequent convictions, counts II and III were
charged as second-degree felonies. Portillo, 914 P.2d at 725. On counts II and III, the
jury was instructed that an element of the offense charged was that" the distribution was
a second or subsequent violation occurring after a previous violation of the same statute."
Id. (emphasis added). Defendant challenged his convictions on the grounds that the jury
instruction incorrectly stated the law because it referred to "violation" rather than, in the
statute's parlance, "conviction." Portillo, Appellant's Brief at 22-23, Case No. 940387CA.
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This Court reversed Portillo's conviction, holding that "the plain language of this
statute reveals this error was obvious." Portillo, 914 P.2d at 726. The holding was based
on the fact that the jury instruction stated that a prior "violation" was an element of the
offense, rather than a prior "conviction" as the statute specified. Thus, the finding of
error in Portillo was based on a semantic variance from the statutory language, not on
whether a prior conviction constituted an element of the crime. The error deemed
obvious in Portillo is not at issue here.
Even if the instruction were error, it could not have been obvious to the trial court.
Defendant cites no cases other than Portillo in support of his contention that the trial court
erred. Since Portillo is readily distinguishable, the "error" was not obvious to the trial
court. A plain error claim must be evaluated under "controlling authority at the time of
the trial." State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Utah App. 1990): see also State v.
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); State v. Harrison,
805 P.2d 769, 779 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). This Court has
refused to hold that plain error occurred where no settled case law controls. State v.
Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah App.), cert, denied 986 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998); State v.
Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Utah courts have repeatedly held that a
trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court.").
In sum, no error, plain or otherwise, occurred.

24

B.

Any Arguable Error was Harmless,
Defendant claims Jury Instruction #5 prejudiced him because it "removed the

attention of the jurors from the issue of entrapment and the conduct of Mangum and
[Edie] Randall and focused it squarely on Stanley's history." Appellant's Brief at 33. He
asserts that the trial court should have bifurcated the evidence of his prior conviction until
after he had been convicted of the current charge. Appellant's Brief at 32-33. Defendant
contends that instructing the jury regarding defendant's prior conviction caused the jury
to be predisposed to convict him. Id.
Assuming arguendo that the trial court plainly erred in instructing the jury that a
prior conviction was an element of possession or use of methamphetamine, the "error"
was clearly harmless.9 Evidence of defendant's prior conviction was already legitimately
put before the jury during defendant's testimony. Defendant candidly acknowledged his

9

Portillo, the case on which defendant relies, recognized that even if a jury
instruction incorrectly states the law, the error does not require reversal of a conviction
unless the error is harmful. Portillo, 914 P.2d at 726. In that case, the Court observed
that "because the instructions required the jury to find more elements than set forth in the
statute before it could convict defendant,... in an abstract sense, the instruction was
more helpful than harmful to defendant." Id, However, in that case, the Court found that
the error was prejudicial to Portillo. During its lengthy deliberations, the jury submitted a
written query to the trial judge, which read: "The 3rd charge, instruction # 5, element # 7
refers to this charge as a subsequent violation. If count one and count two are 'not guilty'
can a guilty verdict be given for count 3 [?]" Id. The court responded "no," and almost
immediately thereafter the jury returned with a guilty verdict on all three counts. Id.
Portillo asserted that the jury's question, coupled with the facts that (1) the evidence
supporting counts I and II was similar and much less convincing than the evidence
supporting count III, and (2) the verdict was rendered almost immediately after the
question was answered, demonstrated that the jury was contemplating a not guilty verdict
as to counts I and II. Id. Based on the unique facts of that case, the Court agreed. Id.
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past felony convictions and the details of those convictions on direct examination (R. 212
at 110-11). That evidence was admissible under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(6) (1999),
which provides that "in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past
convictions for felonies." The evidence was also admissible to rebut defendant's
testimony that he did not know where or how to purchase methamphetamine.
Significantly, defendant does not challenge the admissibility of that evidence.
It is unlikely that the jury instruction focused the jurors' attention on the
convictions any more than defendant's testimony did. Because defendant's convictions
were properly before the jury, the trial court's instruction could not have affected the
outcome.10
C.

Defendant Was Not Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel,
Defendant alternatively seeks review of instruction no. 5 by asserting that his trial

counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Appellant's Brief at 34-37.
"To prevail [on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel], a defendant must
show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Parsons v.
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994\ cert, denied 513 U.S. 966; (quoting Strickland v.

10

Defendant urges this Court to require bifurcated proceedings in drug cases where
the penalty is enhanced for prior convictions. Appellant's Brief at 32-33. However,
bifurcation would not have been appropriate in this case since defendant asserted an
entrapment defense. Evidence of his prior convictions would still have reached the jury.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah
1995). Both deficient performance and prejudice must be present to demonstrate
ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,
874 (Utah 1993).
"[A] defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the difficult burden
of showing actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice." State v. Tyler, 850
P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993). "[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance." State v.
Tavlor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997), cert, denied Taylor v. Utah, 119 S.Ct. 89 (1998)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
"If a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated [this Court] will
assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App.
1993). Thus, "an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable
legitimate tactics or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id. Defense
counsel's decision to ask defendant about his convictions on direct exam was sound trial
strategy. Since the evidence would have been admissible anyway, defense counsel likely
believed that by introducing it herself, she could control the context in which it was
presented and minimize its potential for prejudice. The testimony enhanced defendant's
credibility because it made defendant appear straightforward, honest, and nonevasive.
Once the evidence was before the jury, counsel had no reason to object to the instruction.
Thus, her performance was not deficient.
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"If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice,... that course should be followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670; see
also State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d439, 441 (Utah 1996); Parsons. 871 P.2d at 523. As
explained above, defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction because the information
of his prior convictions was already properly before the jury.
Defendant can show neither deficient performance nor prejudice. Therefore, his
ineffective assistance claim fails.
POINT III
OFFICER TERRY'S TESTIMONY THAT THE MOTEL
WAS WITHIN A DRUG-FREE ZONE WAS SUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to allow the jury to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses occurred within a drug-free zone.
Appellant's Brief at 38.
An appellate court reverses a jury conviction for insufficient evidence "only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983);
see also State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994); State v. Harlev, 982 P.2d 1145,
1147 (Utah App. 1999).
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a) (1998) provides that person is guilty of a firstdegree felony if the person possesses, uses or distributes drugs within 1,000 feet of a
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school, park, recreation center, stadium, playhouse, public parking lot, or other specified
location. Whether a drug offense is committed within a drug-free zone is an element that
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the same trier of fact who decides the
predicate offense. State v. Powasniak, 918 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah App. 1996).
Officer Terry testified that he had represented Lehi City on the Narcotics
Enforcement Task Force for two years (R. 211 at 282). He stated that he "had cases in
the past years where we've had an overview map done of that area, of the motel itself.
And it gives you - when they do that, it's a topographical map, and it just shows you
where it sits. And the playland for McDonald's sits in there as well as, you know, the
high school ball field" (R. 211 at 294). The topographical map showed the motel as the
center of a circle with a radius of 1,000 feet, and was prepared using aerial surveillance
(id.. R. 212 at 10). Furthermore, Officer Terry testified that he had personally measured
the distance of Lehi city blocks, and that there are between 400 and 600 feet in a block
(id.). He said the McDonald's playland was less than "a block and a half away," or 630
feet. (R. 211 at 294). The officer also said that "[t]here's a high school right across the
street, a ball field right across the street from there, and it is within a thousand feet of the
motel" (id).
No .evidence was adduced at trial to counter the officer's definite statements that
the motel was within 1,000 feet of the McDonald's playland, the high school, and the ball
field. Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that any evidence beyond the
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officer's testimony was required. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
the evidence was sufficient.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions.
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Addendum A

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise
ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person
other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor
denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on
the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether the
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be
made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may
permit a later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall
dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the defendant was
not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at
trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be
appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the defense of entrapment is
an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall not be admitted except that in a
trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment
may be used to impeach his testimony at trial.

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A— Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a
first decree felony punishable bv imDrisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2Xa)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2Xb)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXii) or (2XaXiii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4Xa)(i) and (ii);

(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(yiii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(aXi) through (viii); or
——
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

Addendum B

[ 1]
[ 3]
[ 4]

[ 1]

A

Yes, ma'am.

A

I have heard her say that, yes.

[2]

Q

And they were going to have to travel back to

Q

Getting $350 from someone is not something

[ 3]

drugs, is that right?

[2]

that you have to do face to face, is it?

wherever they were from, is that right?

[4]

A

I would imagine.

Q

So we're talking about, what, maybe four

[ 5]

A

Neither -

[5]

[ 6]

Q

That's a simple question.

[ 6\

[ 7]

A

Neither is loaning them $350.

[7]

A

I have no idea.

Getting $350 isn't something that you have to

[8]

Q

A couple of hours travel time on your part?

[9]

A

An hour and a half.

[10]

Q

And this was at 9 o'clock at night, right?

[11]

A

Yes. It was 8 o'clock when I left.

[ 8]
[ 9]

Q

do face to face, though, is it?

[10]
[11]

A

No. It's not something you'd have to do face

to face, no.

hours travel time on their part, is that right?

Okay. Getting the $350 could have been

[12]

Q

What was 8 o'clock?

[13]

accomplished just by asking her to drop it in the

[13]

A

It was 8 o'clock when I left Salt Lake.

[14]

mail, couldn't it have?

[14]

Q

You went to that motel room in Lehi with the

[12]

Q

[15]
[16]
[17]

It very well probably could have, yes.

Q

You probably would have had it the next day

or the day after, isn't that right?

[18]
[19]

A

A

I don't know. I would imagine, yes. If

there were no delays in the mail.

[15]

understanding that you would be meeting there alone

[16]

with Officer Mangum and with Edee, didn't you?

[17]

A

I wasn't even sure.

[18]

Q

Did you expect other people to be there?

A

I didn't even expect Officer Mangum - I

[19]

You could have received it by mail, is that

[20]
[21]

don't - I don't know what I expected. I didn't know

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

[22]

what to expect.

Q

[20]

Q

[21]

right?

[22]

didn't even know if he would still be there. I

When you went to Spanish Fork to collect this

[23]

[24]

money, then you were going to have to travel back to

[24]

two of them in Lehi after they paged you at that motel

[25]

Salt Lake, weren't you?

[25]

room, isn't that right?

[23]
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Q
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[ 1]

A

Yes.

[ 1]

[ 2]

Q

And that was for to you bring methamphetamine

[ 2]

A

[ 3]
[4]
[ 5]

Your agreement was that you were to meet the

go back to that motel room, isn't that right?

[ 3]

knew.

A

At that point?

[4]

Q

Q

Now, from the time that you left Spanish Pork

[ 5]

to them, is that right?

[ 6]

until you arrived in Lehi, there wasn't anyone else

[ 6]

[ 7]

with you, was there?

[ 7]

They had a gun to Edee's head as far as I
Listen to my question. No one was with you,

you weren't kidnapped and taken back there MS. NEIDER: Judge, counsel is badgering the
witness. She asked -

[ 8]

A

No.

[ 8]

[9]

Q

Officer Mangum wasn't there, was he?

[ 9]

THE COURT: No. He hasn't responded to the

[10]

A

No.

[10] respond only to the question.

[11]

Q

Edee wasn't with you?

[11]

[12]

A

No.

[12]

[13]

Q

Wasn't anyone there giving you any kind of

[13]

question. If he'll listen closely to the question and
THE WITNESS: Okay. What was the question?
Q

(By Ms. Ragan) No one dragged you back to

that motel room, did they?

[14]

pressure whatsoever to go through with this, isn't

[14]

A

No.

[15]

mat right?

[15]

O

No one in Salt Lake was there and took you

[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]

A

Officer Mangum had Edee with him at that

point. I took it as hostage.
Q

Neither one of those individuals were with

you, were they?
A

No.

Q

There was nothing that made you go back to

that Lehi motel room, was there?

[16]

and forcibly made you go get that methamphetamine, did

[17]

they?

[18]

A

No.

Q

How much money did you have to give the

[19]
[20]

individual with the black box for the meth?

[21]

A

Zero.

[22]

Q

So this individual that's giving you, what,

[23]

A

Yes. The safety of my friend.

[23]

$600 and apparently you don't know them very well, is

[24]

Q

There wasn't anyone with you. No one had a

[24]

that right? Do you know this person?

gun to your head or anything Kke that that made you

[25]

[25]

A

Yes.

1 l "J
[2]

^*
A

""•w — — •
Somebody that I know.

[2]

[3]

Q
A

Who is it?

[31

Fork and then showed up in Lehi, you were able to then

From past experiences.

somehow find these people and find 13 and half grams,

Q
A

Joe.

[*]
[5]
[6]

Joe what, Mr. Stanley?

[7]

Joe Martinez.

[8]

Where does Mr. Martinez live?

[9]

I don't know.

[4]

|[5]
|[6]
[7]
|[8]
[9]

1 [10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[I*]
[15]

Q
A
Q
A

What is their name?

i

-~w.

-j

Q

And in the time that you went from Spanish

is that right? That all took place in that time span,
is that right?
A

What took place, three or four hours?

Q

From the time you left Spanish Fork and went

to Lehi?

[10]

A

Yes.

Q
A

How did you contact him?

[11]

Q

Okay. You did not tell anyone that you had

By phone.

[12]

to go back to your house, is that your testimony, to

Q
A

Where did you meet him?

[13]

get the methamphetamine?

I have known him from four or five years ago.

1 [161

Q
time?

[17]

A

[14]

A

Right.

Okay. Had you seen him in that intervening

[15]

Q

You didn't tell anyone that you went back

No.

[16]
[17]

there and that your friends or whatever who were there
had sold part of it?

[19]

Q So just based on your phone call, you hadn't
seen him for four or five years, he was willing to

[18]
[19]

[20]

just hand over to you methamphetamine in the amount of

[20]

[21]
[22]

13 and a half grams, is that right? Is that what

[21]
[22]

A

Right.

you're saying?

Q

How — how did you contact Mr. Martinez?

[23]

A

Telephone.

[24]

Q

And where did you meet with him?

[25]

A

I believe it was Second East and 73rd South

[18]

[23]
[M]
[25]

A

I'm trustworthy.

Q And he didn't require you to give him any
moneyr or anything else for that?

1 Page 123
[1]
[2]
[3]
141

[5]
[6]

A

No.

Q

So if anyone is saying that, that just didn't

happen?

Page 124

in Salt Lake City.

|

something.

Q
A

How did you come up with that meeting place?

[1]
[2]

At his suggestion.

Q
A

Where did you make the phone calls from?
A pay phone.

[5]

that could get you some methamphetamine, is that

Q
A

Where was it located?

[6]

right?

Actually it was about five or six of them.

Q

Okay. What's his last name?

[3]

A

I don't know.

[4]

Q

And yet you felt like he might be someone

[7]

A

I was taking a shot in the dark.

[8]

Do you want all the addresses?

[8]

Q

Who else did you call?

[>]
[10]

Q Well, five or six. So five or six different
locations you were making phone calls?

[9]
[10]

A

I called a guy named Bill in West Valley.

Q

What is Bill's last name?

[11]
[12]

A

I don't know.

Q

Okay. Who else?

[13]

A

There was a couple people that weren't home.

[71

[11]
[12]
[13]

A

Right.

Q Is that right? And were those to different
individuals, including Mr. Martinez, is that right?

[14]

A

Yes.

[14]

Q

Okay. Who were they?

[15]
[16]

Q
A

And how did you locate those phone numbers?

[15]

A

There's another guy named Bill.

Well, I located one or two out of the phone

[16]

Q

What was his last name?

[17]

book. And then just asked different people for

[17]

A

I don't know. These are just people. These

[18]

different numbers because I didn't have them.

[18]

are not personal friends. So....

[19]
[20]

Q
A

Okay. Who else did you call?

[19]

Q

Okay. Who else?

Who else did I call?

[20]

A

I don't - and Mark.

[21]

Q
A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

[21]

Q

What's his last name?

I called somebody named Jayson.

[22]

A

I don't know.

How did you know him?

[23]

Q

You don't know his either? Mr. Stanley, how

From my tree service. I had just met him. I

[24]

did you look these people's number up in the phone

[25]

book if you don't know their last name?

[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]

Q
A

was on a job and he lived down the street or

|

1

*J

21
31

r\

wcu, t tooKca we nisi one up —

Q

Now, you said you called a couple of these

people from the phone book?

1 11]
[2]

people.

1

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

1

[3]

A

I think - Joe's number.

1

Okay. Who did you call first?

1

4]

A

Uh-huh (affirmative). Uh-huh (affirmative).

[4]

Q

51

Q

How did you look them up if you didn't know

[5]

A

Who did I call first? I think Bill.

Q

Okay. That's the West Valley Bill or the

«1

n
8]
9)
10]

their last name, sir?
A

Well, Mark, I looked up under Andy's Garage,

because that's where he worked.
Q

So you knew him well enough to know where he

worked?

[7]

other one?

[8]
[9]

A

Okay.

1

Q

And you were able to reach him?

1

[10]

A

And I had his number.

1

["]
[12]

Q

You had his number?

1

A

And he runs Bill's Tree Service.

1

Q

Do you have that number written down or had

1

HI
12]

Q

But you don't know his last name?

13]

A

No.

[13]

1*1
51

Q

He worked at Andy's Garage?
Uh-huh (affirmative).

["]
[15]

it memorized or how did you —

A

«1

Q

And Andy's Garage was open at 10 o'clock at

[161

card, I believe, Bill's Tree Service.

night?

81

A

A
Q

[17]
No. That was one of the people that I

I believe I had it in my wallet. And had his

you call?

is that right?

Q

Okay. Go ahead.

A

Go ahead and what?

PI]

Q

How did you reach these other people if you

[22]

A

didn't know their last names? Or did you have their

[23]

Q

All right. Then who?

41 numbers?
A Like I said, some of them I asked from other
51

[24]

A

I can't recall.
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>1

now, or do you want to continue for about five

n

[1]
[2]

three. They will all be brief, though.

minutes, counsel, and we'll take the noon break?
What's your desire?

[3]

noon break now. Thank you very much.

i]

MS. RAGAN: Judge, now is line.

[41

a

THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, in

[5]

couldn't get ahold of.

01
11
21
3]

>i
>i
i
I
i

light of that, let's take our noon break. I will

[6]
[7]

Don't attempt to learn anything about this case

[8]

outside this courtroom setting. If you've taken notes

[*1

>] don't show them to anyone. And avoid any type of
i media attention as it relates to the case. If we

[10]

]

could come back at five to 1, I'd like to start

[11]
[12]

>i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i

directly at 1 o'clock.

[13]

Let's look at the - just for the benefit of

[14]

the jury in timing this afternoon, how many additional

[15]

witnesses does the State have, or is this the last

[16]
[17]

witness?
MS. NBIDER: You mean the defense, Judge?

[18]

THE COURT: Yeah, defense. Excuse me.

[19]

MS. NEIDER: Possibility of two. I would

[20]

need to confirm whether or not they are here.
THE COURT: Okay. You can confirm that

[21]
[22]

during the noon hour. And would the State anticipate

[23]

rebuttal witnesses?

[24]

MS. RAGAN: At this time I'm anticipating

M

1
1

A

I asked him for the other Bill's number.

Q

And that's one you tried and couldn't reach,
Right.

THE COURT: Do we wish to take the noon break

[25]

caution you not to discuss the case with anyone.

1

And what happened from Bill? Then who did

[18]
[19]
[20]

9]

1
1

A

7]

Right.

[<a

|
THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Let's take our
(Lunch recess taken.)

Addendum C

INSTRUCTION NO. M

It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence
of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.

Addendum D

£,

INSTRUCTION NO.

^ll^OO^p

It is a defense that the defendant was entrapped into committing the offense.

Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the
commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.
The test to determine an unlawful entrapment is whether a law enforcement official or an
agent, in order to obtain evidence of the commission of an offense, induced the defendant to commit
such an offense whiciot&uld-be-ef^^
mcfeiy given the opportunity to comnrirthe-effenser' l
/

Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close

personal friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, are examples, depending on an evaluation
of the circumstances in each case of what might constitute prohibited police conduct. In evaluating
the course of conduct between the government representative and the defendant, the transactions
leading up to the offense, the interaction between the agent and the defendant, and the response to the
inducements of the agent are all to be considered in judging what the effect of the governmental
agent's conduct would be on a normal person;-
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Addendum E
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Page 16

[ 1]

the state. When we opened or started, I told you a

people who are involved in drugs, was greedy. Generally

[ 2]

story about perspective, about the guy who was walking

I [ 1]
[ 2]

The defendant and this is the case with most

[ 3]

people involved in this type of thing use

[ 3]

down the trail, thought he saw a bear, wasn't a bear, he

[ 4]

methamphetamine, and we know in this case he was. In

| 4]

saw a tree; that perspective can be drastically

[ 5]

fact he was so anxious, he did it immediately as soon as

I 5J

different depending upon where you're standing in

he had the opportunity.

[ 6]

reviewing the facts of a situation, and I think that's

[ 7]

essential in this case, because as the state has stated

[6]
[ 7]

Most people in that situation need money to

[ 8]

support their habit and that leads them into the

[ 8]

and as Ms. Ragan has argued in her closing arguments,

[ 9]

distribution of the methamphetamine, and that's exactly

[ 9]

there are a lot of things that look really bad to

[10]

what we have in this situation. He was set up by

[10]

Patrick Stanley. And if you step far enough away, you

| [11]

someone that he knew. And he's upset about that

[12]

upset that he got caught

[13]

it

He's

But that's all there is to

He got caught and committed a crime and needs to

[11]

can see why the state wants to make this case. And why

(12]

they're arguing that he is guilty of distribution, and

[131

possession or use of methamphetamine. And that's not

[ 14]

hard to see the State's perspective from there.

I [14]

held responsible for that. He did not have to do the

[15]

deal. He had more than ample opportunity to call it

[15]

[16]

off

[16]

and we don't just take their word for it but analyze

[17]

expressed that to him in all of these types of things.

[17]

the facts and look at the evidence, and you do that now

He says that Edie was afraid of this guy and

[18]

So you heard Edie testify. You have to evaluate for

[18]

[19]

yourself if he's telling the truth about this. Edie has

[19]

[20]

no reason to come in here and lie, in fact she has even/

But what is important is we don't stop there,

from

Patrick Stanley's perspective, and you do that

based upon what he knew, what he saw, what he was told,
and how he felt. Because that's what matters. And

[21]

reason, maybe to try to support the defendant's point of

[21]

that's because the crimes that they have charged

[22]

view at this point, or whatever, because as you might

[22]

require, as Ms. Ragan has indicated to you, and as she

| [23]
[24]
i [25]

guess, she's probably not real fond of police officers.

[23]

read from the instructions, both instruction number 4

She's had her runs-in with them, too. So her

[24]

and number 5, the elements of the offense here, and the

testimony ~ she has no reason not to come in here and

[25]

elements of both of those crimes, require that he

Page 17

Page 19

[1]

[ 1]

knowingly, and intentionally has committed these crimes.

tell you what she remembers happened. She admitted some

| [ 2]

things that were very unfavorable to her. She mentioned

[2]

If he was entrapped by the state's confidential

| [ 3]

to you she has been involved in drugs, purchased drugs

[ 3]

informant then they can't say that he was acting

and those types of things. She has no reason to lie

[ 4]

knowingly and intentionally. We can't have both of

about that.

[ 5]

those. We can't say he was entrapped and yet it was of

[ 6]

his own free will and intended to do it. And that's why

bring to your attention at this point in time. As the

[7]

we have argued and talked about entrapment, because

court has told you. I will have an opportunity to

[ 8]

Patrick Stanley on those occasions didn't act knowingly

I [ 4]
[ 5]
I [ 6]
I [ 7]
[ 8]

I think that's basically all that I want to

I [ 9]

address you again. That's because the state has the

[ 9]

and intentionally. And those two, those two words are

' [10]

burden. But as I said, in the beginning in my opening

[10]

in the elements of both crimes, and are essential to the
crimes.

| [11]

statement the state is asking you to find him guilty of

[11]

| [12]

both of those crimes, both the distributing

[12]

| [13]

methamphetamine and the possession or use of

[13]

This isn't a balancing test and it isn't
something that says, well, I think maybe he did eight of

| [14]

methamphetamine and we'll ask you to do what you've been

[14]

the 9 of those things or even if he did 5 of the 9 of

j [15]

asked to do, take on this responsibility and follow the

[15]

the elements. He has to do every single one of them.

I [16]

court's instructions in that regard. Thank you.

[16]

He has to have acted knowingly and intentionally, and if

[17]

THE COURT: Thank you, counselor.

[17]

he didn't do that then he's not guilt

| [18]

Ms. Neider, you may proceed.

[18]

found guilty of the crimes that the state has accused

| [19]

MS. NEIDER: Thank you. Judge.

[19]

him of

| [20]

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. It's

[20]

And he can't be

The entrapment language the Judge read to

| [21]

been along time and we appreciate your patience and

[21]

you, and I know you don't have that in front of you yet

| [22]

understanding and being here and just your attendance.

[22]

bill you wli„

| [23]

And we appreciate what you're going to do next most and

[23]

tell you what to expect
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room I want to you take it out and read rt and analyze

I want to focus on that for a minute and
And when you get in the jury

1 rayv
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Patrick Stanley was entrapped in this case. The statute

[ 1]

called him, that was in custody: that was in jail, that

I [2]

says, "entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer

[2]

had - and he was dealing with somebody who was a very

I [3]

[1]

or person directed by or acting in cooperation with the

[3]

seasoned confidential informant and that the other

[4]

officer - " that's the first thing, was Edie Handle.

[4]

officers had worked with her, and another officer asked

[5]

She wasn't a law enforcement officer but was she a

[5]

him to go, and he did that. That's all he did, and

I [6]

person directed by or acting in cooperation with an

[6]

that's all he knew.

officer? Clearly she was that

[7]

He testified that he didn't ask her any

[7]

She had called, and she

I [8]

had worked - she had called Detective Mangum. She had

[8]

questions about what she understood, necessarily of what

I [9]

worked with other officers before. She set up the buy.

[9]

her responsibilities were. He didn't go into the law of

[10]

she went with them, she was in there - she was with

[10]

entrapment with her, because he thought that had been

[11]

them constantly. They were watching her and they were

[11]

done. But he didn't check the file to see if it had

[12]

both concerned for her safety and they wanted to make

[12]

been done or which officer had done it or how long ago

[13]

sure things went well. She was with them at all times

[13]

they had done it

[14]

that Patrick Stanley was present. He never dealt

[14]

to the fact she said I can set up a buy.

[15]

directly with the officer without her there. She was

[15]

So he - it's also important to look at what

[16]

working in cooperation with the officers. That means

[16]

he told us he had been trained to do. He had been

[17]

that the entrapment statute applies.

[17]

trained to check out any information given for him by a

[18]
[19]

I [20]
[21]

I [22]

The next part of that says, "does that person

[18]

confidential informant. He said that's the first thing

induce the commission of an offense? The language of

[19]

they tell them at some of those schools they go to, is

that statute directly focuses on the verb there, "did

[20]

check out and check, and check their information. And

that person induce the commission of an offense?" What

[21]

he didn't do that in any of these situations.

did that person do in order is to induce the commission

[22]

[23]

of an offense? Now. we have heard several times that

[23]

[24]

nobody held a gun to Patrick Stanley's head. We have

i [24]

[25]

heard that nobody went with him to Salt Lake to get it,

[25]

Page

21

He also said the other things they teach
them, is tell them about the law and watch out for their
safety. He didn't tell her about the law, but I think
that he watched out for her safety. And he was with

Page 23

[1]

that nobody forced him to do anything. How many times

[1]

her, or had another officer with her to make sure that

[2]

have we heard that? Nobody forced him to do anything.

[2]

she was going to be safe, except for those few times she

[3]

That's not what entrapment says. Entrapment says, "did

[3]

was conversing with Patrick Stanley.

[4]

they induce the commission of an offense?" And I think

[4]

[5]

the evidence shows that that's what has occurred here.

[5]

[6]

is Edie Randle used what she knew about Patrick Stanley

[6]

marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. Now those

[7]

in order to get him to get her some methamphetamine.

[7]

aren't serious charges. As one of the witnesses

Now, let's talk about Edie Randle. She was
in custody-

She had been picked up for possession of

[8]

And he went to Salt Lake, and he did. And I want to

[8]

testified, that a lot of times one can expect to be

[9]

talk about some of the other evidence, but I want you to

[9]

released on those kind of charges relatively quickly,

[10]

think about everything you have heard in the last two

[10]

either by the sheriff or perhaps by a judge. But the

[11]

days in light of that statute. Did she induce the

[11]

bottom line is, Edie Randle didn't know when she was

[12]

commission of this offense? And if she induced it then

[12]

going to be released either by the sheriffs department

[13]

he didn't do it knowingly and intentionally.

[13]

or the judge. She was in custody. Can you think of

[14]

anyplace scarier to be if you have set up and organized

[14]

I

He made a lot of assumptions just due

We talked earlier about the standards that

[15]

law enforcement have to live up to. And what the law

[15]

170 organized controlled buys? It didn't matter if she

[16]

enforcement officers did in this case, is relevant.

[16]

had been ticketed for speeding or was in custody for jay

[17]

Detective Mangum testified that he had heard of Edie

[17]

walking.

[18]

Randle. but he didn't know her personally, and he had

[18]

mattered is she was in custody and she wanted out of

[19]

heard it over a period of time, he wasn't sure how long,

[19]

custody and that was her main concern, and she wanted to

[20]

that she had organized or arranged, participated in.

[20]

get out and she was willing to do anything to get out

[21]

somewhere in the neighborhood of 170 controlled buys for

[21]

of custody. And what she did at this point was set up

[22]

drugs of some sort

[22]

Patrick Stanley. And she knew she could do that. And

[23]

she knew that she could induce him or coerce him into

[24]

helping her get methamphetamine.

He also testified that it was

[23]

common for him to participate in about 15 buys a month.

[24]

And that was a busy month for him. So he knew going, in

rnci

It didn't matter what she was facing. What
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reminder, either from the state or from myself, she was

1
1

[i]
[2]

on two or three occasions when she had gone out with

[2]

able to remember a few more details. But she was a

officers, to be careful and to watch her back, and if

[3]

little foggy on what happened in some of them. 1 think

[3]

She said that she had been told

[ 1]

received prior to that

[4]

she got in too keep, to get out

[4]

in other situations, she didn't know what was going on

[5]

ever been told what the law of entrapment was. She said

[5]

or she misrepresented what was going on. At first she

no, she couldn't explain it to us. and in fact she said

[6]

said she didn't have a conversation with Patrick Stanley

[7]

she had never been told there were boundaries she

[7]

by herself, but when 1 asked her more questions about

[8]

couldn't go past in getting someone to sell her

[8]

that she said she did. and gave us some more details

[ 9]

methamphetamine. That is so far past what can actually

[9]

about that

[10]

happen because the statute says right there that if they

[10]

[11]

induce the commission of a crime - she's never been

[11]

as it went on, and maybe some of that is because she was

[12]

told that

She's never been told - if she induces the

[12]

just reciting from memory and it was back in March. But

[13]

commission of a crime, it's not a valid controlled buy.

[13]

1 think she was also willing to misrepresent the truth.

[14]

She can't charge somebody or somebody can't be convicted

[14]

And 1 think that is evidenced by a couple of things.

[15]

of tihat She had no idea what it was she was doing.

[15]

One, it is relevant that when she testified in these

[16]

proceedings previously she said she didn't have a

[17]

criminal history. Then we find out she did have some

(Bench conference held)

[18]

misdemeanor convictions from a couple of years ago. And

MS. NEIDER: Let me finish telling you what

|[6]

THE COURT: Counsel, will you both approach

[16]
[17]

1 asked her if she had

thn bench?

[18]

1 think that her story changed a little bit

[19]

that she maybe was unclear as to when 1 was asking that

the rest of the entrapment instruction says.

[20]

question. But when 1 asked her the question, if she had

[21]

'Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or

[21]

had a criminal history, she said, no, she didn't 1

[22]

person directed by or acting in cooperation with the

[22]

think it's also important when in weighing her testimony

[23]

officer - ' we've read - 'that induces the commission

[23]

and credibility, as we stated before, she has been

[24]

of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the

[24]

convicted previously with conspiracy to defraud the

[25]

commission for prosecution, by methods creating a

[25]

federal government

[19]
[20]

[1]

I [2]

substantial risk that the offense would be committed by

I i]

one not otherwise ready to commit i t '

[2]

[3]

And all of those are things that

Page 27

Page 25

in looking at that in a whole, talking about

|

you can weigh in assessing her credibility.
And Ms Ragan has stated that Edie Randie has

[3]

no reason to lie, she has no reason to come today and

[4]

the inducement and whether or not that happened, and

[4]

lie about the facts as they occurred. 1 want you to

[5]

what that means, it's important to couple that with the

[5]

think about that. She did 170 controlled buys, at $75 a

[6]

remaining part of that that it has to be done by

[6]

piece in about a six to nine month time period is how

[7]

methods creating a substantial risk that the offense

[7]

long she testified. This was her source of income.

I [8]

would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit

[8]

This is how she made her livelihood. Even though she

I [9]

it

[9]

was in custody, and that was a priority to her as well.

[10]

And those do have to be coupled together.

[10]

fixing the problem and showing the state that she is a

statute, and you'll have the entire statute when you get

[11]

witness that's willing to testify, or that she is

[12]

back there. 1 don't want to mislead

[12]

willing to do what they have asked her to do by coming

[13]

than an offer, obviously - 1 mean it takes more than

[13]

here and making the facts appear as believable as

[11]

And it's important to focus on the entire

It takes more

[14]

that to entrap somebody. And if by inducing them to

[14]

possible. I think she does have incentive to lie. and

[15]

commit the offense by methods creating a substantial

[15]

what she was paid and what she was given by the state,

[16]

risk that the offense would be committed by mm not

fiej

in general, I think, is applicable in this case, and she

[17]

otherwise ready to commit it looking at that as a

[17]

was a paid confidential informant and you can weigh

[18]

whole, that's what you want to analyze and apply on a

nei

that in assessing her credibility.

[19]

whole to the situation.

H i|
Uuj

user and uses methamphetamine.

[20]

Let's talk about Ms. Randie and what we know

She also admitted on the stand she is a drug
Officer Mangum testified

[21]

about her. She testified this morning and the State

[21]

for us earlier that it's very common that confidential

[22]

called her and asked her some questions about what

[22]

informants are either past drug users or current drug

[23]

happened. She was not very clear on what occurred on

[23]

users and that is not an unusual situation. And she

this event There were a lot of things she couldn't

U4|

stated that she had used that - 1 believe she stated

I B4]

1
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[1]

I [2]
I [3]
I [4]
I [5]
I [6]
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ail of that is essential in weighing the testimony, and

in

County, and that she spoke to Patrick Stanley. She

what she has to say. And her testimony is essential and

[2]

paged him, he called her back and that a phone call

important because there were times, and it's the times

[3]

occurred. She told Nm she had been in the hospital.

that Patrick Stanley has told you were the most

[4]

and she was - at one point and he stated that she also

important in terms of what she said to him, and what she

[5]

indicated that she had been there for a week; that she

did with him, it was just the two of them, it was

[6]

had rolled her truck and that's why she hadn't called

[7]

Patrick Stanley and Edie Randle in that car, and it was

[7]

Nm previously. Officer Mangum said she did mention the

I [8]

Patrick Stanley and Edie Randle in the bathroom in the

[8]

hospital, and that that's why she would be bringing a

I [9]

motel. And officer Mangum and none of the other

[9]

friend, and that is why she didn't have a ride to just

officers couldn't hear, and that's when the entrapment

[10]

come and see Patrick herself. And that phone call was

[11]

occurred. And Patrick Stanley verses Edie Randle in

[11]

the beginning of her using what she knew about Patrick,

[12]

terms of what happened during those times is what you

[12]

entrapping Nm into getting her the methamphetamine she

[13]

have. She said - and she offered she never got into

[13]

needed.

[10]

I [14]

his car. and she didn't do that. And Patrick Stanley

[14]

[15]

has told you that she did. And that they had a

[15]

Fork. The State has proven there were a lot of officers

[16]

discussion about what she needed and what she wanted.

[16]

there. And we've heard from several of the officers and

[17]

And also when they were in the motel room, she had a

[17]

what their responsibilities were, and what they all did.

discussion about what he was able to get and what he

[18]

The bottom line is there was one officer who was there.

wasn't able to g e l

[19]

and who spoke with Patrick Stanley. Most of the rest of

[20]

them - some of them could hear over the body wire what

I [18]
[19]
[20]
[21]

And also talking about Ms. Randle it's

Let's talk about what happened in Spanish

important to see - it's important to talk about what

[21]

was said when all three of them were together

I [22]

she knew about Patrick Stanley. She had told him her

[22]

discussing, and some of them couldn't see or hear

I [23]

husband died in a mining accident and she was having

[23]

anything, but that they were there for security

[24]

financial difficulties, and she had allowed him to help

[24]

purposes. So we know there were a lot of officers

[251

her previously. He had been down to her house and he

[25]

there.

Page 29
[1]

I [2]
I [3]

house. He had fixed a pick up or car that was out back

[1]
i [2]

Everybody thought somebody else was making a
tape, and nobody ended up making a tape, so we can't

that he thought was for her daughter. They had a

[3]

general friendship in that way. But most of the things

[4]

Patrick Stanley said he heard, and what Edie Randle said

that occurred, from what Patrick Stanley described, were

[5]

she heard and said, and what Officer Mangum can

him helping her, if she was in need of help. And he

[6]

attribute to that. But that conversation would not be

[7]

also testified that once - that when she needed money

[7]

the conversation that happened between Edie and Patrick

[8]

to make a trailer payment, he gave her the $350.00 that

[8]

Stanley. And Officer Mangum testified there was a

[4]
[5]

I [6]

I [9]

verify what came over the body wire except for what

she needed. 1 don't know whether or not she really

[9]

conversation that occurred outside of Ns presence and

[10]

needed it for a trailer payment or if she was

[10]

he doesn't know what was said.

[11]

misrepresenting that

[12]

what was told to Patrick Stanley and that's why Patrick

[12]

went to Spanish Fork, is because Patrick Stanley didn't

[13]

Stanley gave her the $350.00.

[13]

want to just come down for a small time deal. He wanted

We don't know that

But that's

[11]

Patrick felt like he had

Officer Mangum also stated the reason they

[14]

some Honor and some responsibility to help her that

[14]

to come down for a significant source of money, and he

[15]

night And she knew because he had helped her

[15]

wasn't going to waste Ns time. Officer Mangum also

[16]

previously, that she could count on that or she could

[16]

stated that as far as he knew, Patrick didn't have any

[17]

use that against Nm. And that's what she did, and

[17]

drugs with Nm, and that's what Patrick represented; he

[18]

that's why he was the one that she picked.

[18]

didn't have the methamphetamine, and he would have to go

[19]

back to Salt Lake and get it or go back home as officer

[20]

proven in this case. And remember, we've all said it

[20]

Mangum testified. If he didn't want to waste Ns time.

[21]

[19]

II want to talk about what the State has

before: The State has the burden of proof. And the

[21]

and he wasn't doing it for small change, why did he go

[22]

State has to prove each of those elements by proof

[22]

ail the way back to Salt Lake to get it? Why didn't he

[23]

beyond a reasonable doubt

[23]

show up to the K-mart in Spanish Fork, if he thought

[24]

what Edie had offered Nm on the phone and if he thought

M
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Page 31

testified that he had helped her fix things around the

It is their burden, and

let's talk about what they have proven. They have

- .... -

1

C

I

[I]

it in Spanish Fork?

[ 2]

Officer Mangum testified he had passed the

[1

efforts that he went through to get that

[2

big admission from Patrick, that he knew that he had

And that is a

been convicted of that previously, and that he knew

[ 3]

test. He didn't feel like Patrick Stanley thought he

[3

[ 4]

was an officer or that he was worried by whether or not

[4;

people who used drugs. But you can't take that and say

[ 5]

he was wearing a wire, anything like that

[5

because he knows people who use drugs, he is a drug

He said he

[ 6]

felt like he had passed the test

[e:

dealer. Those aren't the same thing, and they're not

[ 7]

and Patrick Stanley really intended to distribute

[7

equal

[ 8]

methamphetamine to Edie Randle that night why didn't he

[s:

[ 9]

just do it in Spanish Fork? The state can't tell you

[9

get it and because he felt that Edie Randle was in

[10]

why

no:

need, he was willing to go through the steps to do it

- didn't do that

If that's the case,

And I think there's a good

He has testified that he knew where to go to

[II]

reason why he didn't do that because that's not what

[11

And he told you he is not a drug dealer, and he does not

[12]

his intention was when he went to Spanish Fork. He went

[12

make a living doing that

night is contrary to what he does and what he is.

And what occurred on that

[13]

to Spanish Fork in order to pick up the $ 3 5 0 that Edie

[13

[14]

Randle said she would pay Nm back. That's what was

[14,

[15]

said to him over the phone and that's why he went there.

[15

has said: Why didn't he call the police? Why didn't he

[16]

The state also, in their case, have alleged

Hindsight in this case is 2 0 / 2 0 . The state

[16

just walk away? Why didn't he do those things? That's

[17]

that Patrick was gone for a period of time, and when he

[17

easy to say at this point

[18]

came back to Lehi that they were in a motel room; that

[18

Stanley to stay on that night but he didn't feel like

[19]

Patrick and Edie had a conversation in the bathroom, and

[19

he could walk away. He didn't feel like he could call

[20]

then they came out, and the drugs, the methamphetamine

[20]

the police. He didn't know what else to do, except for
help out Edie Randle. And that's what he did.

It wasn't easy for Patrick

[21]

and the money changed hands. Now the officer has

[21

[22]

testified that Patrick gave that to Nm directly.

[22:

[23]

Patrick has testified that he gave that to Edie. and J

[23;

[24]

don't believe that Edie could remember or testify as to

[24;

specifically the car and the things that were found in

[25]

what happened there. And the state has proven that

[25;

the car. The officers and the gentleman from the cnme

There are some other things that the State
has put into evidence that I want to talk about, and

Page 33

Page 35

[ 1]

occurred. But the state hasn't been able to prove that

lab testified that some of the those things found in the

[ 2]

didn't occur because of Pat's concern about the welfare

[1
[2

[ 3]

of Edie Randle. And that is Ns perspective. That is

[3

bottom line is, it wasn't Ns car. And second thing is,

[ 4]

the main perspective I want you to take back in that

[4

all of the things they found could be used for legal

[ 5]

jury room with you, is he was concerned for her and

[5;

purposes. They could be used for camping purposes.

[ 6]

worried about her safety and he wasn't going to leave

[e;

They could be used in - I forget some of the other ones

[ 7]

her there. And he was going to do what he needed to do

[7;

that were testified to, furniture or to strip furniture

[8]

to help her

[8

or strip paint off of tNngs

And again, the state has said that their

car could be used to manufacturer methamphetamine. The

All ol those tNngs, even

[ 9]

relationship was not one that would inspire such

[9

if they were Patrick Stanley's, could have been in that

[10]

concern, but that's not true. Patrick has told you that

[io;

car for legal purposes. But the bottom line is Patrick

[11]

he was worried about her and she was a friend. She

[it

told you they were not Ns tNngs. and it's in Joel's

[12]

testified that she was relying on her friendship with

[12

car and he was borrowing Joel's car while Joel borrowed

[13]

Patrick for Nm to get her the methamphetamine. She was

[13

Ns truck. And those tNngs should not color your view

[14]

relying on that. That's what Ns response was, and

IK

of what Patrick Stanley is or what Patrick Stanley did

[15]

that's what occurred there. They did have a friendsNp.

[15

that night

Because those, for one thing, are not

[16]

They didn't know all of each other's friends or know

[16

elements of the crime, and they don't make it any more

[17]

everything about each other, but they were friends and

in;

or less likely that he was entrapped.

[18]

he has testified to that and so has she.

[18

[19]
[20]

Pat has admitted to you he knows people who
have used methamphetamine, and he's admitted to you of

We've talked a lot about the $350, and we've

[i9;

talked a lot about what it was for, and what the

[2o;

understanding of the two parties was about that $350.

[21]

possessing methamphetamine in 1994. He knew when she

[21

And Edie has told you it was for a past drug deal.

[22]

asked for the methamphetamine, that although he didn't

[22

Patrick has told you it was for the house trailer

[23]

have any, and he is not a drug dealer, that he could

[23;

payment

[24]

probably get some contacts and he could probably find

[24;

verify what the purpose of that was for, is Susan Webb,

[25]

some

[25

her daughter Ryan and Tiffany, who didn't testify but

And he's testified to you truthfully about the

And the only other people we would have to
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[1]

would have testified similarly to Susan, that that $ 3 5 0

[1]

some things that could be interpreted in different ways

was for the trailer payment and that's important

[2]

and he told you the truth about what happened on March

because that's why Patrick Stanley went to the K-mart in

[3]

27th.

I [2]
I [3]
[4]

Spanish Fork, was to recoup that $ 3 5 0 debt that he had.

[4]

I [5]

I want to talk for a second about the

[5]

The bottom line you have to look at is can
you really say that Patrick Stanley acted knowingly and

[6]

drug-free zone. The instructions the Court has given

[6]

intentionally? And if you look at the entrapment

[7]

you is that in order to establish something by proof

[7]

statute and apply the language that is there, that

I [8]

beyond a reasonable doubt you have to determine that

[8]

entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or

[9]

based only on the legal evidence presented in court.

[9]

person directed by or acting in cooperation with the

[10]

Officer Terr/ testified that there was a McDonalds

[10]

officer, induces the commission of an offense in order

[11]

across the street and down the block, and that across

[11]

to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by

[12]

the next major street there is also a school over there.

[12]

methods creating a substantial risk that the offense

[13]

And he testified that he believes, and he has seen

[13]

would be committed by one otherwise not ready to commit

[14]

information that would indicate that is within a

[14]

it

[15]

thousand feet of where this occurred in the motel in

[15]

[16]

LeN. Now, what we have then is that Officer Terry

[16]

offense. And he wasn't there to sell drugs. And if

[17]

believes it is within a thousand feet. And that that

[17]

what they did was contrary to the entrapment statute.

[18]

makes it a drug free zone.

[18]

and if what Edie Randle told him and said to Nm in the

[19]

car and in the bathroom shows that he was entrapped.

proven to you here in court based only upon the legal

[20]

then you can't say that he acted knowingly and

[21]

evidence presented in court? Does that meet the state's

[21]

intentionally.

I [22]

burden to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt? And if

[22]

[19]
[20]

But my question to you is has that been

Patrick Stanley wasn't ready to commit that

Thank you again for being here, and thank you

[23]

it doesn't, that's an element of the offense, and they

[23]

for taking your job seriously, and thank you for

[24]

haven't proved their case, if they haven't proved that's

[24]

weighing the evidence fairly and impartially. We would

[25]

within a thousand feet

[25]

ask that you come back with a verdict of not guilty on
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The bottom line in this case is, did Patrick

[1]

both of the charges that Patrick Stanley is facing
today.

[2]

Stanley knowingly and intentionally distribute

[2]

[3]

methamphetamine, and did he knowingly and intentionally

[3]

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

[4]

possess or use methamphetamine? The court - or the

[4]

Ms. Ragan?

[5]

State has focused on his use of methamphetamine and said

[5]

MS RAGAN: Thank you. Judge.

[6]

that the officer saw him snort methamphetamine out of

[6]

[7]

that box, and Patrick has told you that's not what

[7]

courthouse you were not required to throw away your

[8]

happened, and that's not what he did, but that he was

[8]

common sense. That's what counsel is asking to you do.

[9]

blowing the stuff out of the box, and he blue it out to

[9]

if you're to believe the story the defendant told you.

[10]

clean it out and he stuck it back in his packet

[10]

It's your right to use the common sense you have, to

[11]

that is what his testimony is. And his testimony is

[11]

judge whether or not the things that he says happened

[12]

believable, and Ns testimony should be looked at in

[12]

and Edie Randle said happened, what makes sense.

[13]

light of Ns perspective and in light of what happened

[13]

[14]

to him there.

[15]

And

He's testified that he's - that he had, four

Ladies and gentlemen, when you came into this

1 asked the defendant about whether or not he

[14]

had access to the police report the transcripts and

[15]

those items. And 1 did that for a specific reason.

[16]

years ago, been convicted of that possession charge.

[16]

because it was obvious to me that what he had done is

[17]

And he also has testified that he doesn't have the same

[17]

sat down and gone through each of those things and

[18]

lifestyle that he had then, and he has changed and he is

[18]

fashioned his story so he absolutely had no

[19]

a different man. And all of that goes to whether or not

[19]

responsibility for anything in this case. And even to

1 [20]

you believe him or you believe the officer's testimony.

[20]

the point that he says if he touched that box, then it

[21]

And based upon everything that has happened in this

[21]

was knocked out of Ns hands when the police came in.

[22]

case, I thin*: that the evidence shows that Patrick

[22]

[23]

Stanley's testimony is believable, and that he sits

[23]

anyone could have had that series of events happen, that

before you today, and he was willing to own up to the

[24]

add up to Nm having no responsibility for absolutely

I [24]

It was just ridiculous to even imagine that

Addendum F

INSTRU^ON^NO^—2_
The essential elements of the crime\:harged in 40toggai9of the Amended Information are as
follows:
if)

That the defendant, Patrick Stanley,

(2)

On or about March 27, 1997,
In Utah County, Utah,

4£?

Did knowingly and intentionally,

/v$)

Use."' JWs«&

@

Methamphetamine,

. $)•

A Schedule !! controlled substance,

®

In a drug free zone,

5)

And had previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance on fibfrftrin*'

••', p#mm

h^\ !^i.

•

If the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more
of the above essential elements of the crime, you should find the defendant not guilty. On the other
hand, if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as
set forth above, then you should find the defendant guilty of the crime.

